Intentional Torts

From Torts Wypadki

Contents 1 Intentional Torts 1.1 Generally 1.2 Assault 1.2.1 Elements 1.2.2 Cases 1.3 Battery 1.3.1 Elements 1.3.2 Cases 1.4 False Imprisonment 1.4.1 Elements 1.4.2 Cases 1.5 Outrage (IIED) 1.5.1 Elements 1.5.2 Cases 1.6 Trespass to land 1.6.1 Elements 1.6.2 Statute of Limitations 1.6.3 Cases 1.7 Trespass to chattels 1.7.1 Elements 1.7.2 Necessity (Distinguished from self-defense) 1.7.3 Cases 1.8 Conversion 1.8.1 Elements 1.8.2 Cases 1.9 Defenses

Intentional Torts

Generally

(1) Act

• Volitional movement
• Not reflex

(2) Intent: desire the result or knows to a substantial certainty that it will occur.

• The conception of intent differs from tort to tort under the heading of "intentional torts"
• Substantial certainty or desire counts as intent and is subjective.
• Transferred intent: applied to 5 intentional torts: (1) Battery, (2) Assault, (3) False Imprisonment, (4) Trespass to Chattel, and (5) Trespass to land. Does not transfer to Conversion.
  • Person to person
  • Tort to tort
• Motive is irrelevant, and is distinguished from intent.
  • (Note that whether evidence of motive can be used at trial to establish intent or another element is a question for evidence law.)

(3) No issue of incompetence

• Children as well as the mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and demented can commit intentional torts

(4) Causation

• Actual
• Proximate
  • (Causation is considered in more depth under the heading of negligence, but the same concepts apply)

(5) The Mistake Doctrine: if a defendant intends to do acts which would constitute a tort, it is no defense that the defendant mistakes, even reasonably, the identity of the property or person he acts upon or believes incorrectly there is a privilege.

Assault

An intentional creation of an immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive touching

Elements

(1) Act

(2) Intent

• Can be intent to effect an assault
• The defendant must desire or be substantially certain that her action will cause the apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact.
  • Or intent to effect a battery

(3) Causation

(4) Reasonable Apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact

• Fear distinguished from apprehension--need not produce fear in the victim.
• Apprehension--it is about to happen, and is imminent
• Apparent ability sufficient
• Words alone are not sufficient
  • But words can negate the effect of conduct

(5) Immediacy

Cases

Beach: unloaded gun

• That the pointing of a gun, in an angry and threatening manner, at a person three or four rods distant, who was ignorant whether the gun was loaded or not, was an assault, though it should appear that the gun was not loaded, and that it made no difference whether the gun was snapped or not.
• Court held it was an assault even though he didn't know if the gun was loaded.
• Action is compensible

Brooker: D threatened telephone operator over phone

• An assault is an immediate apprehension of offensive or harmful contact.
• Immediacy
  • In this case, it was not immediate, but future.
  • This threat only promises a future injury and usually gives ample opportunity to provide against it, while an assault must be resisted on the instant
• Apprehension/Fear
  • There must be just and reasonable ground for the fear; hence a vain or idle threat is not sufficient
  • The D’s threat was not of such nature or made under such circumstances as to put a person of ordinary reason and firmness in fear of bodily hurt
  • There has been reluctance on the law to give a cause of action for mere words.
  • Words never constitute an assault is a time honored maxim because they can be misunderstood, thoughtlessly spoken
  • Fear is not sufficient to establish apprehension and it is not necessay to establish apprehension.

Vetter: crazy guy in vehicle next to her

• Assault: an intentional threat or attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to do bodily harm to another, resulting in immediate apprehension of bodily harm. No bodily contact is necessary.
• There was evidence of a threat
• words can constitute an assault if together with other acts or circumstances, they put the other in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact with his person
• here, there was fear but there was not apprehension because there was no move towards the vehicle that cuases her to feel she was going to be imminently harmed.

Wishnatsky: ND case (Office fight. Sued for battery saying Huey closed the door on him pushing him out of the office)

• In order that a contact be offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity, it must be one which would offend the ordinary person and as such one not unduly sensitive as to his personal dignity.
• It must, therefore, be a contact which is unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted.
• Rude and abrupt conduct did not rise to the level of battery
• The attorney's conduct would not be offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity

Battery

An intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive touching of a person.

Does not require intent to harm, only necessary D intend to cause either harmful or offensive contact

Elements

(1) Act

(2) Intent

• Can be intent to effect a battery
  • or intent to effect an assault

(3) Causation-the defendant's voluntary action must be the direct or indirect legal cause of the harmful or offensive contact.

(4) Touching

• Can be direct or indirect (e.g., setting something in motion, laying a trap)
  • Touching of a person includes anything connected to the person

(5) Harmful or Offensive

• Judged by a reasonable-person standard
• The offensive contact need not even physically touch the body.
• There is no requirement that the victim be conscious of either the contact or its harmful or offensive nature at the time of the intrusion.

(6) Issues

• "Eggshell plaintiff" rule
  • Ex: Vosburg v. Putney-where a school boy playfully but without privilege slightly kicks a classmate without intending harm, he is responsible for the unexpected serious illness which resulted.
  • Ex: Where a physician performs a medical procedure without the patient's consent.

Cases

Koffman (football coach tackling innocent football player)

• Gross negligence: that degree of negligence which shows indifference to others as constitutes an utter disregard of prudence amounting to a complete neglect of the safety of another.
  • Must shock fair minded people
  • Because reasonable persons could disagree on this issue, a jury issue was presented, and the trial court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, the second amended motion for judgment was inadequate to state a claim for gross negligence.
• Assault: consists of an act intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery
• Battery: an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, or justified
  • No assault because there was no apprehension of fear, but there is a battery
  • The trial court erred in holding the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment was insufficient as a matter of law to establish a claim for battery

Haeussler (neighborly confrontation over dog)

• when using self defense, you must not use more force than the ordinary person and what is reasonably necessary to protect yourself
• RULE: One who is in an altercation with another has the right to use such force as is necessary to protect himself from bodily injury.
  • The question of the amount of force justifiable under the circumstances of a particular case is one for the trier of fact.

Katko (spring gun)

• property owners are not permitted to use excessive force, including force calculated to cause death or great bodily harm, to protect their property except to prevent the commission of felonies of violence and where human life is in danger
• The instructions explained that breaking and entering is not a felony of violence
• ISSUE: Whether an owner may protect personal property in an unoccupied boarded-up farm house against trespassers and thieves by a spring gun capable of inflicting death or serious injury.
• RULE: The possessor of land may not arrange his premises intentionally so as to cause death or serious bodily harm to a trespasser.
  • The possessor may of course take some steps to repel a trespasser.
  • If he is present, he may use force to do so.
  • If the trespasser threatens harm to property only, the possessor would not be privileged to use deadly force, he may not arrange his premises so that such force will be inflicted by mechanical means.

Jones (took bite plate)- sexist case

• D owned a nursing home. P worked for them. P was told that her teeth were bad and that she needed an upper plate. D’s volunteered to loan her $200 for the dental expenses. Shortly after getting the plate, she quit working for the Ds. They argued about the loan. Mr. F seized P and Mrs. F grabbed her face and extracted her upper plate.
• Jury found that Ds committed assault and battery.
• Ct lowered punitive damages from $2,500 each D to $1,000 each.

False Imprisonment

The intentional confinement, experienced or harmful, of a person to a bounded area. Unlawfully acts to intentionally cause confinement or restraint of the victim within a bounded area.

• Accidental confinement is not inlcuded and must be addressed under negligence or strict liability.
• The victim must be aware of the confinement at the time of the restraint.
• Psychological, physical, and economic injury occasioned by the imprisonment.

Elements

(1) Act (or omission)

• Failure to release

(2) Intent--can be transferred.

(3) Causation

(4) Confinement

• Sufficient methods of confinement
  • Physical barriers
  • Physical force
  • Threats of force
    • can be directed at the victim, her family, companions, or property
    • the restraint that results from not abandoning her property constitutes imprisonment.
    • Ex. victim detained on a yacht surrounded by water without access to rowboat.
  • Invalid assertion of legal authority
• Insufficient methods of confinement
  • Moral pressure
  • Future threats
• Duration of confinement is irrelevant-but obviously, the amount of compensation received will be a factor.

(5) Bounded area

• Movement must be limited in all directions
• Any reasonable and reasonably knowable means of escape negates this element
• The bounded area cannot be the rest of the world, but can be an entire state.

(6) Awareness of harm

• If plaintiff is unharmed, but is aware of the confinement, this element is satisfied
• Likewise, if plaintiff is unaware of the confinement, but is harmed by the confinement, this element is satisfied

(7) Omissions

• False imprisonment can also result from a defendant's omission when the defendant had a legal duty to act.

Improper Assertion of Legal Authority(False Arrest)

• Unlawfully restraining a victim is a form of false imprisonment.
  • The actor making the arrest must be privileged, i.e. police officer, private citizens of cause.
  • Confinement that is privileged is not unlawful.
  • False imprisonment requires that the victim be conscious of the confinement at the time of imprisonment.

Cases

Fojtik : (forced into alcohol treatment) - other sexist case

• Elements of false imprisonment:
  • willful detention by D,
  • without consent of the detainee, and
    • consent is invalid when the action is illegal (IE: Dueling hypo with Erin Burr and Alexander Hamilton)
  • without authority of law. A detention may be accomplished by violence, by threats, or by any other means that restrain a person from moving from one place to another.
• To what extent must Ps insist on their freedom and have it denied them before they can recover for FI?
  • None of the factors that are considered in evaluating whether treats are sufficient to overcome the P’s free will, i.e., the relative size, age, experience, sex, and physical demeanor of the participants, weight in F’s favor
  • F was not a young, inexperienced woman, not physically restrained
• The fact that Charter permitted F to leave on passes undermines his claim for FI rather than supporting it.

Grant: (THE SHOPKEEPERS PRIVILEGE)

• There is an issue of material fact concerning whether Grant was detained, and whether he consented to stay in the store
• D claimed shopkeepers privilege
• The shopkeeper’s privilege provides that a person who reasonably believes another person has stolen, or is attempting to steal property, is privileged to detain that person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time to investigate the ownership of the property.
  • Three components:
    • A reasonable belief a person has stolen or is attempting to steal
    • Detention for a reasonable time
    • Detention in a reasonable manner
• The test of liability is based on the reasonableness of the store’s action under the circumstances!
• Stop-N-Go did not negate any element of Grant’s FI claim as a matter of law, and Grant raised genuine issues of material fact on each element. SJ on this claim was improper.

Thurman: (stolen lawnmower case)

• Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known
• ISSUE: Whether Miller deprived Thurman of a federal constitutional right.
  • Whether a seizure occurred?
    • The S. Ct. held that a seizure occurs when a gov’t actor “by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”
    • A seizure “requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.”
  • There were 2 seizures here
    • When Miller grabbed Thurman outside of his garage
    • When Miller caught Thurman after pursuing him in the van and on foot
• 3 factors that determine whether force was reasonable
  • “the severity of the crime”
  • “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others”
  • “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”
• HOLDING: SJ based on qualified immunity is inappropriate. A reasonable jury could find that Miller’s seizure of Thurman was unreasonable in the circumstances. A reasonable jury could conclude that Miller’s conduct created a high probability of serious harm and was unjustified by any offsetting potential benefit to the public.

Outrage (IIED)

The intentional or reckless infliction, by extreme and outrageous conduct, of severe emotional distress

Elements

(1) Act

(2) Intent or recklessness

• Note that recklessness counts as "intent" for outrage
  • Extreme and outrageous conduct-is behavior which is "beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
• The standard here is high -- must be truly outrageous

(3) Causation (4) Severe emotional distress

• For recovery under IIED, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to cause severe emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard as to whether the victim would suffer severe distress.
• Although characterized as an "intentional" tort, recklessness, in addition to intent, generally suffices for liability.
• Must be enough that plaintiff sought medical attention
  • Requires proof both that the defendant intended or recklessly imposed the risk of severe mental distress and that the victim actually suffered severe mental distress.
• Most states no longer require that the victim suffer physical manifestations of the mental distress.

(5) Issues

• The "eggshell plaintiff" doctrine does not apply to allow unusually sensitive plaintiffs to recover for act that would not cause severe emotional distress in persons generally
• However, if the defendant knows about the unusual sensitivity, a cause of action will lie
• Outrage is also known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress" or "IIED"
• Innkepers, common carriers, and other public utilities (such as a telegraph company) are liable for intentional gross insults which cause patrons to suffer mental distress.

Cases

Wilson: (Age discrimination)

• plaintiff was entitled to both back pay and front pay upon determination that employer's conduct in demoting and humiliating plaintiff resulted in constructive discharge
• outrageous conduct has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.... (has to be extreme outrageousness and sever emotional distress).
  • Generally, the case is one in which a recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous.”

Dillon

• holding that the plaintiff could recover for serious emotional distress for witnessing the accident, even if she was only in "close proximity" to the accident and not within the "zone of danger"
• It seems obvious that the shock of a mother at danger or harm to her child may be both a real and serious injury
• Whether D owes P a duty of due care, cts will take into account such factors as
  • Whether P was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it
  • Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon P from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence
  • Whether P and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with a absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distance relationship
• These factors will indicate the degree of the D’s foreseeability

Trespass to land

An intentional physical invasion of a person's real property. Can be the earth, other material beneath the surface, and "the air space above it."

Elements

(1) Act

(2) Intent

• The only intent needed is the intent to do the act that results in the physical invasion
• Not knowing that the land belongs to another person does not negate the intent element

Causation

(3) Physical invasion

• Person or object
• Does not include intangibles, e.g., vibrations or odors

(4) Real Property

• Surface
• Subsurface
• Airspace to a reasonable distance

Statute of Limitations

• Permanent trespass
  • unabatable trespass, the limitations period begins to run when the trespass is first committed.
• Temporary trespass
  • abatable trespass, the limitations period begins anew with each day that D has failed to remedy the trespass.

Cases

Burns Philip Food v. Cavalea Contl.

• ISSUE: Whether Illinois conditions damages on the landowner’s notice to the trespasser.
• HOLDING: Judgment vacated and case remanded for two purposes: to limit damages for unjust enrichment to the five-year period preceding the suit, and to calculate and award damages that Cavalea sustained from the trespass.

Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co.

• ISSUE: What is the liability of a trespasser for personal injuries suffered by the possessor of land as an indirect result of the trespass?
• A trespass results from an innocent mistake and, in that sense, is not deliberate or willful, does not relieve the trespasser of liability thereof or for any of the results thereof.
• One who authorizes or directs another to commit an act which constitutes a trespass to another’s land is himself liable as a trespasser to the same extent as if the trespass were committed directly by himself, and this is true even though the authority or direction be given to one who is an independent contractor.
• One who trespasses upon the land of another incurs the risk of becoming liable for any harm which is caused to the possessor of the land by any conduct of the trespasser during the continuance of his trespass no matter how otherwise innocent such conduct may be.

Trespass to chattels

An intentional interference with the right of possession of personal property.

D's acts must damage the chattel, deprive the possessor of its use for a substantial period of time, or totally dispossess the chattel from the victim.

Elements

(1) Act

(2) Intent--can be transferred

(3) Causation

(4) Interference

(5) With right of possession

• Physical contact
• Dispossession
• Interference with use

(6) Chattel

• something tangible that you own, livestock, computer
• Not people
• Not real property
• Not intangible property
  • Unless reduced to a tangible form (e.g., negotiable bearer bond)

(7) Issues

• Distinguish from conversion
  • Conversion exists only when the damage or other interference with the personal property is sufficiently serious to justify a forced sale to the defendant. The defendant is liable for the entire market value of the chattel and not simply a smaller repair or rental cost.

Bad Faith not Required--killing a dog thinking it was a wolf.

• See notes below

Necessity (Distinguished from self-defense)

2 kinds of necessity

(1) Private necessity - Incomplete defense where you owe compensation for the damage you cause (no punitive damages or injunction)

• Exists when individual appropriates or injures a private prop interest to protect a private interest valued greater than the injured prop
• Individual has the privilege to interfere w/prop right of another to avoid greater harm but must compensate P for interference

(2) Public necessity - Complete defense where you do not owe compensation for damage you cause if you are trying to defend the public from something

Cases

Vincent v. Lake Erie Trans Co.

• Steamship Reynolds, owned by D, was discharging her cargo moored to P’s dock in Duluth. During unloading a storm developed. Reynolds signaled for a tug, but none could be obtained. During the storm the boat damaged the dock at the amount of $500.
• Here those in charge of the vessel deliberately and by their direct efforts held her in such a position that the damage to the dock result, and, having preserved the ship at the expense of the dock, it seems to us that her owners are responsible to the dock owners to the extent of the injury inflicted.
• The defendant has a partial privilege to protect its private property from serious harm.
• The defendant will be subject to liability to anyone who is injured.
• That by holding the boat in a position against the dock, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock, then the owner of the boat is liable for damage.

Conversion

An intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so substantially interferes with the plaintiff's rights as to require defendant to be forced to purchase it at full value.

Elements

(1) Act

(2) Intent

(3) Interference

(4) Chattel

(5) Substantiality

• So substantial, the act warrants a forced sale

(6) Issues

• Distinguishing conversion from trespass to chattels
  • Factors mitigating in favor of conversion
    • Length of time withheld
    • Amount and severity of damage
    • "Totaled"
  • Factors tending to negate conversion
    • Repairable damage
    • Temporary nature of deprivation
• In the remedy for conversion, after paying damages, the defendant retains the converted property
• Purchasing stolen property, even if the purchaser was acting in good faith and not aware the seller did not have title, constitutes conversion by both the seller and innocent buyer. Both the seller's and the buyer's acts seriously interfere with the ownership of the rightful owner.

Cases

Moore v. Regents of UCLA

• Moore theorizes that he continued to own his cells following their removal from his body, at least for the purpose of directing their use, and that he never consented to their use in potentially lucrative medical research
• “To establish a conversion, plaintiff must establish an actual interference with his ownership or right of possession ....
• Where plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged to have been converted, nor possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for conversion.
• Since Moore clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal, to sue for their conversion he must have retained an ownership interest in them.
• First consider – Whether the tort of conversion clearly give Moore a cause of action under existing law. The court does not believe it does.
• Next consider – Whether it is advisable to extend the tort to this context.

Defenses

• Consent: If the asserted victim gives permission, what would otherwise be tortious is instead privileged.
• Self-Defense: Reasonable force can be used where one reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect oneself from immediate harm
• Defense of Others: a person can use reasonable force to protect a 3rd person from immediate unlawful physical harm
• Defense and Recovery of Property: An individual is privileged to use reasonable force to prevent a tort against her real or personal property. BUT a reasonable mistake will not excuse force that is directed at an innocent party.